000			02795cam a22002294a 4500
020			_a9780521765770 (hbk.)
020			_a0521765773 (hbk.)
020			_a9780521148085 (pbk.)
020			_a0521148081 (pbk.)
082	0	0	_a333 _bLUO/O
100	1		_aJones Luong, Pauline.
245	1	0	_aOil is not a curse :
260			_aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _c2010.
300			_axiii, 425 p. : _bill., maps ;
490	1		_aCambridge studies in comparative politics
520			_a"This book makes two central claims: first, that mineral-rich states are cursed not by their wealth but, rather, by the ownership structure they choose to manage their mineral wealth and second, that weak institutions are not inevitable in mineral-rich states. Each represents a significant departure from the conventional resource curse literature, which has treated ownership structure as a constant across time and space and has presumed that mineral-rich countries are incapable of either building or sustaining strong institutions - particularly fiscal regimes. The experience of the five petroleum-rich Soviet successor states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) provides a clear challenge to both of these assumptions. Their respective developmental trajectories since independence demonstrate not only that ownership structure can vary even across countries that share the same institutional legacy but also that this variation helps to explain the divergence in their subsequent fiscal regimes"--Provided by publisher.
520			_a"This book makes two central claims: First, that mineral-rich states are cursed not by their wealth per se but rather by the ownership structure they chose to manage their mineral wealth; and second, that weak institutions are not inevitable in mineral-rich states. Each claim represents a significant departure from the conventional 'resource curse' literature, which has treated ownership structure as a constant across time and space and presumed that mineral-rich countries are incapable of either building or sustaining strong institutions - particularly fiscal regimes. The experience of the five petroleum-rich Soviet successor states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) provides a clear challenge to both of these assumptions. Their respective developmental trajectories since independence demonstrate not only that ownership structure can vary even across countries that share the same institutional legacy, but also that this variation helps explain the divergence in their subsequent fiscal regimes"--Provided by publisher.
650		0	_aPetroleum industry and trade
650		0	_aCommonwealth of Independent States.
700	1		_aWeinthal, Erika.
942			_cBK
999			_c33717 _d33717